Europe should choose whether it wants Greece in or out

by Jean Pisani-Ferry

Financial Times
August 22, 2012

For the third time in three years the Europeans’ stance on Greece is economically inconsistent.

The first time was in 2009-2010 after then prime minister George Papandreou indicated that he would need to file for assistance from the International Monetary Fund. The European response was to reject the principle of IMF intervention while not offering an alternative to it. It took several months until an agreement was found, in May 2010, to combine European and IMF conditional support.

The second time was in 2010-2011 when Greece’s solvency became the urgent issue at hand. Two camps emerged. One advocated swift debt restructuring, emphasising that Greece was a unique case and that markets could be convinced that no other European country would follow suit. The other one stressed the adverse spill-over effects of a default and favoured keeping Athens afloat through cheap loans. The compromise was to lend at penalty rates while letting markets expect that restructuring would perhaps come, but at a later date. Each of the two positions was internally consistent but the compromise was not. It took more than a year, until the second half of 2011, to recognise this contradiction.

The third time is now. Again, Europe is divided. One camp, well represented in northern Europe, considers that Greece should leave the eurozone because it is not fit for purpose either economically or politically. This view is actually held by both eurosceptics (who want to demonstrate that exit is possible) and europhiles (who hope to win over opposition to further integration). The latter camp, more vocal in France and southern Europe, is adamant that the integrity of the eurozone must be preserved, because Greece’s departure would have adverse contagion effects on other southern countries.

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Greece's pensioners face looming poverty

by Chloe Hadjimatheou

BBC News
August 22, 2012

Few in Greek society have escaped the effects of the country's austerity programme. But it is Greece's elderly who may be suffering the most. Falling pensions, rising taxes and pressure on family support networks are causing stress for many.

Leo is a stout 64-year-old whose twinkly eyes are framed by a mane of long grey hair and a bushy beard.

Last year, unable to make ends meet, he joined the ever-growing numbers of homeless on the streets of Athens.

Although his son, who is in his 20s, supports Leo in every way he can, his own circumstances prevent him being able to house his father.

But Leo counts himself lucky because he has a bed in one of the few shelters in the capital.

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Greece can unbind itself from torment

Letter by Desmond Lachman

Financial Times
Editorial
August 23, 2012

Sir, In arguing his case that Greece should not be ejected from the euro, George Pagoulatos appeals to the ancient Greek myth of the noble Iphigenia, who was sacrificed by her father so that his warships might have a fair wind to Troy (“Greece should not be sacrificed for the euro”, August 16).

In Greece’s present day context, one has to wonder whether it might not have been more apt for Prof Pagoulatos to have considered the alternative Greek myth about the punishment Zeus meted out to Prometheus by binding him to a rock and having an eagle eat out his liver on a daily basis.

For much in the same way as Prometheus was bound to a rock and had an eagle administer him daily punishment, Greece is now bound to the euro and has the troika administer to it daily punishment through excessively severe budget austerity that has already plunged the Greek economy into a depression of epic proportions.

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The Eurozone Crisis Continues

by Austin Bay

Real Clear Politics
August 22, 2012

The Olympic games, ancient Greece's gift to the contemporary sports world, ended with a closing ceremony featuring British pop stars, aging rock icons and classical musicians. The show's promoters described it as a "mash-up" of British music.

Now the summer party's over, and the prospect of a eurozone smash-up has returned to the headlines, as key European Union leaders and international lenders meet to discuss modern Greece's fiscal menace to the eurozone and the global economy.

The menace to the eurozone is most immediate. Though Greece is by no means the sole culprit in the eurozone crisis, Greece is the eurozone's foremost economic mess. It is likely the zone's foremost political mess.

Greece's fractious government, organized in late June, yokes the center-right New Democracy Party, the Socialist Party and the Democratic Left Party in an uncomfortable coalition. To their credit, the troika understands that Greece must cut its government budget, begin to reduce its long-term public debt, reform the tax system, attack corruption and encourage private enterprise.

Yes, even Greece's old socialists now know that the private sector is where real, sustaining wealth is created.

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Germany Doesn’t Help Europe by Undermining the Euro

by Clive Crook

Bloomberg
August 22, 2012

Investors are bracing themselves for yet another euro-area moment of truth. How many does that make?

The European Central Bank’s policy-making body meets Sept. 6 amid speculation that it will try to strengthen the euro system by capping borrowing costs for Spain and other distressed governments. Even as rumors, denials and clarifications swarm around that question, Europe’s finance ministries are also deciding whether to give Greece more time to mend its public finances.

These two issues, Greece’s solvency and the integrity of the euro system, are increasingly being muddled together. That’s dangerous. It’s vital to keep them separate. Europe’s prospects would improve at a stroke if one notion could be stamped out -- that the European Union will ease Greece and other possible defaulters out of the euro system unless they try harder to balance their books.

Greece is still insolvent and in the end another Greek default is probably unavoidable. This needn’t -- and mustn’t -- mean that Greece exits the euro. Another default would be a far smaller setback for Greece and the rest of the system than a Greek exit, and the two outcomes are perfectly separable. Yet ministers and officials keep talking as though one implies the other.

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Three Thorny Paths to Saving the Euro

Spiegel
August 21, 2012

Greece may soon face bankruptcy, but what would happen after that? If governments and central banks want to preserve the euro, they might have to take some very risky steps -- each with its own potential dangers. Europe has begun searching for the lesser of several evils.

Will Greece obtain fresh aid or slide into bankruptcy? Those will be the fundamental issues at stake when Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras travels to France and Germany this week for meetings with French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Even though the talks won't result in official decisions, the two most important politicians in the euro zone will know after these meetings just what they can still expect from Greece -- and they will draw the necessary conclusions.

For the currency union as a whole, however, the Greek tragedy itself is merely a prelude to the real battle to save the euro. If Greece actually did go bankrupt or left the currency union, the main priority for the rest of the bloc would be to use every means possible to prevent a further dissolution of the euro zone -- even if these means have some quite problematic aspects.

The key issue will be to prevent the remaining crisis countries from suffering the same fate as Greece. The main priority will be to prevent the yields on Spanish and Italian government bonds from rising any further. Spain already has to pay very high risk premiums compared with Germany. For 10-year German government bonds, investors last week demanded an interest rate of about 1.4 percent. For Spanish bonds, the rate was 6.7 percent.

As a result, Spanish interest rate payments are rising even though the government is doing all it can to cut spending. That is making it even harder for Spain to break out of the vicious circle of debt, austerity and recession.

Experts fear that if Greece becomes insolvent, investors will panic and demand higher interest rates from Spain or Italy. That would force the two countries to seek external aid.

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Why a collapse of the Eurozone must be avoided

by Anders Åslund

Vox
August 21, 2012

It has become increasingly fashionable to talk about Europe without the euro. But this column points out that in the last century Europe has seen the collapse of three multi-nation currency zones: the Habsburg Empire, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia – and they all ended with disastrous hyperinflation. The lesson for the Eurozone is clear: avoid break up at almost any cost.

Articles on a possible breakup of Eurozone either see it as a mere devaluation (Lachman 2010, Roubini 2011) or reckon that its collapse would amount to a major economic disaster (Buiter 2011, Cliffe et al. 2010, Normand and Sandilya 2011). It seems the latter is more likely. Large imbalances have accumulated between southern debtor countries and northern creditor countries. Any capping of these balances would disrupt the payments mechanism between the Eurozone countries and impede all economic activity (Åslund 2012).

In the last century, Europe saw the collapse of three multi-nation currency zones, the Habsburg Empire, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. They all ended in major disasters with hyperinflation. In the Habsburg Empire, Austria and Hungary faced hyperinflation. Yugoslavia experienced hyperinflation twice. In the former Soviet Union, ten out of 15 republics had hyperinflation (e.g. Pasvolsky 1928, Dornbusch 1992, Pleskovic and Sachs 1994, and Åslund 1995).

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In Europe Only the Politically Impossible Solutions to the Euro-Crisis Offer Fiscal Sanity and Moral Responsibility

by Matthew Feeney

Reason 
August 20, 2012

Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras will be meeting with eurozone leaders this week in the hope of convincing them to extend the deadline for austerity measures to be met. The Greek government is hoping that international creditors will hand over $38.8 billion next month. Without the funds Greece will almost certainly have to default on its debt. That Samaras is engaging in these meetings indicates that he is not confident that the troika audit will deliver good news.

If the troika audit does not recommend more Greek bailouts European politicians will rush to make the next move. The problem is that there is no agreed upon strategy for what to do if Greece did not meet the austerity conditions.

One option would be to let Greece continue to receive funds regardless of the Greek government’s inability to get their budget under control. The German government is against this option and understandably wants some semblance of moral responsibility to be present in whatever assistance Greece might receive. While this attitude is prevalent in Merkel’s government, Merkel seems to be warming to the idea of letting the Greeks receive bailout funds without having met the previously agreed upon austerity conditions. This would set a worrying precedent. Italy and Spain are far from stable, and Greece getting bailed out without fiscal reform could send a signal that would only worsen the crisis.

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Could the ECB Cap Euro-Zone Bond Yields?

Wall Street Journal 
August 20, 2012

An article in Der Spiegel released this weekend stated that the ECB is considering setting interest rate thresholds for each country for the future purchase of government bonds. Dow Jones's Geoffrey Smith examines the feasibility of such a move.

  

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Greek Shortfall Growing Ever Larger

Spiegel
August 20, 2012

The Greek prime minister has spent weeks searching for ways to come up with 11.5 billion euros to satisfy international conditions for emergency aid. Now, though, SPIEGEL has learned that the shortfall may be as much as 14 billion euros. German politicians are becoming increasingly exasperated.

Athens has not been having an easy time coming up with the €11.5 billion in cost cutting measures over the next two years it has promised Europe. Indeed, Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras is reportedly set to request an additional two years to make those cuts during meetings later this week with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Friday and French President François Hollande on Saturday.

But according to information obtained by SPIEGEL, the financing gap his country faces could be even greater. During its recent fact-finding trip to Athens, the so-called troika -- made up of representatives from the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund -- found that Greece will have to come up with as much as €14 billion to meet the terms for international aid.

According to a preliminary troika report, the additional shortfalls are the result of lower than expected tax revenues due to the country's ongoing recession as well as a privatization program which has not lived up to expectations. The troika plans to calculate the exact size of the shortfall when it returns to Athens at the beginning of next month.

The news of the potentially greater financing needs comes at a sensitive time for the country. Many in Europe, particularly in Germany, are losing their patience and there has been increased talk of the country leaving the common currency zone. Over the weekend, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble reiterated his skepticism of additional aid to Greece. "We can't put together yet another program," he said on Saturday, adding that it was irresponsible to "throw money into a bottomless pit."

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Greeks go back to basics as recession bites

by Chloe Hadjimatheou

BBC News
August 20, 2012

As Greece sinks ever deeper into the most severe economic depression in living memory, some young people are taking drastic action to change their lives.

In the spring of 2010, just as the Greek government was embarking on some of its harshest austerity measures, 29-year-old Apostolos Sianos packed in his well-paid job as a website designer, gave up his Athens apartment and walked away from modern civilisation.

In the foothills of Mount Telaithrion on the Greek island of Evia, Mr Sianos and three other like-minded Athenians set up an eco-community.

The idea was to live in an entirely sustainable way, free from the ties of money and cut off from the national electricity grid.

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Tension Over Aid to Greece Could Unsettle Markets

New York Times
August 19, 2012

While the Greek prime minister, Antonis Samaras, will be greeted with military honors when he arrives in Berlin on Friday, his pleas for easier bailout terms could meet with a cool reception, setting up tension that could unsettle the financial markets next week.

Their summer vacations over, European political leaders appear to have resumed the maneuvering that has so often caused market turmoil and frustrated outsiders hoping for a quick solution to the euro zone debt crisis.

Mr. Samaras, who leads a fragile coalition, is under intense political pressure at home to provide relief from the austerity that has made life tough for many Greeks. Amid continuous political turmoil and depressionlike economic conditions, Greece has not been able to meet the timetable to get government spending under control or carry out changes intended to improve tax collection and create a better climate for business.

During a week that will take him to Berlin and Paris, Mr. Samaras is expected to ask for a two-year extension for Greece to meet its budgetary and reform commitments. He is scheduled to meet with Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, on Friday, and François Hollande, the president of France, on Saturday.

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Banking union and the financial architecture of the Eurozone: A retrospective

by Xavier Vives

Vox
August 20, 2012

Does Europe need a banking union? This column argues that banking union is necessary but not sufficient for monetary union to survive. To cope with sovereign risk more political and fiscal integration is needed.

The Eurozone crisis has brutally exposed the inadequacy of institutional financial arrangements in the Eurozone. Modalities of banking union are being discussed now and the late June 2012 Eurozone summit agreed to give the ECB supervisory powers and, once this common supervisor is in place, it will allow direct capital injections into banks using the European Stability Mechanism. The European Commission will release a more concrete proposal on 11 September.

Other necessary elements of a banking union are a common Resolution Agency (RA) of troubled banks and a common Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). Indeed, the central bank is the liquidity authority but it cannot be at the same time the solvency authority since bank restructuring may have fiscal consequences. The fact that a monetary union needed common stability and regulatory facilities is not news. This was pointed out, for example, by Folkerts-Landau and Garber (1994) as well as in an early CEPR report (Chiappori et al. 1991), and several authors, academic networks, and think tanks have insisted overtime on the issue. Twenty years ago I proposed the following architecture:

1) The ESCB (European System of Central Banks) should perform a Lender of Last Resort function if the stability of the European financial and payment system is to be preserved.

2) The Lender of Last Resort function of the ESCB needs to have associated supervisory powers, although, perhaps, the ESCB need not have them in the exclusive.

3) The concern for a potential misuse of the Lender of Last Resort facility by a ESCB with supervisory powers is legitimate but not overwhelming. Indeed:

4) A potentially optimal structure could be for the ECB to have authority in liquidity matters while another European agency has authority over solvency matters (and perhaps deposit insurance). In this arrangement both agencies would have supervisory powers but the ECB would have the primacy." (Vives 1992)

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Europe’s challenge

Financial Times
Editorial
August 19, 2012

In Romania, attempts are made to limit the powers of the constitutional court. In Hungary the government tightens its grip on the media, the courts and cultural activities. And in Serbia a new government is stamping its authority over the once independent central bank. Each of these developments on its own is cause for concern. Taken together they suggest that a blight on democratic progress may be spreading over the south-eastern edge of the EU.

If a democracy is defined merely as a state where governments can be removed without violence there would be little to criticise. Elections in the former communist EU member states and in those hoping to join are generally free and fair. But democracy is about more than the ballot box. It is about the independent institutions that guarantee a government’s accountability to its citizens. In Romania and Hungary, already members of the EU, and in Serbia, which aspires to membership, these are being compromised. Each case has its own unique characteristics. Post-Soviet struggles for power are being played out in different ways. The democratic culture has not yet taken deep root. But it is also clear that the economic crisis has had an effect. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has identified a worrying deterioration in attitudes towards democracy and the market economy in these countries after years of hardship. This should be an issue of urgent concern to Europe. The risk of contagion is real, with austerity in countries such as Greece already fuelling dissatisfaction.

Brussels must do more to avert the rise of anti-democratic practices in these states. It has tried to rein in the worst excesses in existing members, but its powers are feeble. EU member states should be prepared to use available sanctions such as suspending a country’s voting rights, rather than considering this a “nuclear” option that can only be threatened but never implemented. Other tools should be considered.

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Barry Eichengreen: Σχέδιο τύπου Μάρσαλ και όχι νέα δάνεια χρειάζεται η Ελλάδα

Συνέντευξη στη Δάφνη Mατζιαράκη

Καθημερινή
19 Αυγούστου 2012

Η τιμωρία που έχει υποστεί η Ελλάδα είναι δυσανάλογη των λαθών της, σημειώνει σήμερα, σε συνέντευξή του στην Κ, ο κ. Μπάρι Αϊχενγκριν, καθηγητής Οικονομικών και Πολιτικών Επιστημών στο Πανεπιστήμιο του Μπέρκλεϊ στην Καλιφόρνια. Οπως επισημαίνει, η Ελλάδα αυτή τη στιγμή χρειάζεται βοήθεια και όχι περισσότερα δάνεια. Χρειάζεται ένα σχέδιο τύπου Μάρσαλ. Αν η τρόικα πει «όχι» στην επόμενη δόση τον Σεπτέμβριο, τότε η Ελλάδα, όπως υποστηρίζει, θα οδηγηθεί αυτομάτως εκτός Ευρωζώνης.

– Ποιος είναι ο απολογισμός για την πορεία της Ελλάδας 2,5 χρόνια μετά την ένταξή της στον μηχανισμό στήριξης;

– Η ισχύουσα πολιτική λιτότητας δεν πρόκειται να βγάλει την Ελλάδα από την κρίση. Κάθε φορά που ζητήθηκε από τη χώρα να αυξήσει τους φόρους της και να περικόψει δαπάνες, η ύφεση βάθαινε, δεν επετεύχθη καμία βελτίωση στον προϋπολογισμό και την ίδια ώρα οι συνέπειες στον πληθυσμό ήταν περισσότερο οδυνηρές. Θεωρώ ότι το σχέδιο του Μνημονίου πρέπει να αλλάξει. Η Ελλάδα έχει δίκιο που ζητάει περισσότερο χρόνο, ωστόσο δεν είμαι σίγουρος ότι η τρόικα θα της τον δώσει.

– Τα μέτρα που λαμβάνει η Ελλάδα είναι τελικώς ανάλογα των λαθών της;

– Πιστεύω ότι η τιμωρία που έχει υποστεί η Ελλάδα με την πτώση του ΑΕΠ της κατά 17% δεν αναλογεί στα λάθη που έχει κάνει. Αυτό που χρειάζεται τώρα η χώρα είναι ένα πρόγραμμα ενίσχυσης από το εξωτερικό, όχι άλλα δάνεια. Θεωρώ ότι η Γερμανία θα έπραττε σοφά αν έδινε τη χείρα βοηθείας στην Ελλάδα όπως στην ίδια δόθηκε το σχέδιο Μάρσαλ από τις ΗΠΑ μετά το τέλος του Β΄ Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου. Απ’ ό, τι όμως φαίνεται, η Γερμανία δεν κινείται προς αυτήν την κατεύθυνση. Το τι πρέπει να γίνει από οικονομικής πλευράς είναι απόλυτα ξεκάθαρο, πολιτικά όμως είναι πολύ δύσκολο να επιτευχθεί.

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UBS Reveals Who Really Won The Euro — And Why This Is Creating A Huge Political Problem

by Joe Weisenthal

Business Insider
August 19, 2012

The hot read in Euro-economics this week was a note from UBS' Paul Donovan titled Who wins with the Euro? (Both ZeroHedge and FT Alpha have written about it)

The question is controversial, because there's some insinuation that whoever "won" the euro should now be in a position to make concessions helping those who lost.

Usually the argument goes: Germany has been the big winner from the euro, and now it's time to pay back the periphery.

And there's a good argument to be made on that front, especially if you look at historical trade data, and see that the German export monster pretty much clobbered everyone else in the bloc, causing them to run big deficits, while Germany boomed via vendor financing.

But Donovan's note looks instead at which countries saw the highest real disposable income gains from the time the Euro was established through 2010.

What this chart shows is Real Disposable (after-tax) Household Income Growth in each country by income decile.

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Η «ηθική» του ελληνικού συνδικαλισμού

του Ιωάννη Ληξουριώτη

Καθημερινη
19 Αυγούστου 2012

Παρακινήθηκα για τις σκέψεις που ακολουθούν από τον εύστοχο τίτλο «Κινητοποιήσεις με το “πρώτο κουδούνι”» ενός ρεπορτάζ της Καθημερινής που αναφέρεται στα άμεσα απεργιακά σχέδια της Διδασκαλικής Ομοσπονδίας Ελλάδας (ΔΟΕ). Τι αποφάσισε λοιπόν το καλό αυτό συνδικάτο των δασκάλων των παιδιών μας; Να κηρύξει απεργιακή κινητοποίηση «με το πρώτο κουδούνι», την 12η Σεπτεμβρίου, την ημέρα δηλαδή που τα παιδάκια θα έχουν την πρώτη τους επαφή με το σχολείο ή θα επιστρέφουν στα μαθητικά θρανία. Εκείνη λοιπόν την «ευαίσθητη» ημέρα οι μικροί μαθητές θα βρεθούν αντιμέτωποι με τα αγριεμένα πρόσωπα των συνδικαλιστών-δασκάλων που θα κλείνουν τις εισόδους των δημοτικών σχολείων και θα δίνουν τα πρώτα μηνύματα για το τι είδους «εκπαίδευση» πρόκειται να λάβουν κατά τον μαθητικό τους βίο. Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι εφέτος οι συνδικαλιστές της ΔΟΕ έχουν κάνει μια σημαντική επαναστατική «πρόοδο» σε σχέση με πέρυσι που πραγματοποίησαν την πρώτη τους απεργιακή κινητοποίηση με καθυστέρηση δύο εβδομάδων από την έναρξη της σχολικής χρονιάς. Εφέτος, η απεργία των δασκάλων θα είναι κατ’ ουσίαν συστατικό στοιχείο του ίδιου του σχολικού αγιασμού ή, μάλλον, θα συμβεί το αντίθετο. Οι ιθύνοντες της ΔΟΕ θα ραντίσουν τα παιδάκια με το «καθαγιασμένο ύδωρ» της συνδικαλιστικής τους ευαισθησίας.

Εδώ όμως ακριβώς προκύπτει το τεράστιο ηθικό έλλειμμα του ελληνικού συνδικαλισμού. Επειδή οι καλοί συνδικαλιστές της ΔΟΕ θεωρούν ότι δεν μπορούν πια να ζουν με την αγωνία εάν θα προχωρήσει ή όχι το μέτρο της «αξιολόγησης» των δασκάλων, αδιαφορούν παντελώς για τα παιδιά, τους γονείς και την κοινωνία και στήνουν μια ακόμη προληπτική απεργία. Σιγά μην σκεφθούν οι αξιότιμοι κύριοι συνδικαλιστές τι σημαίνει για ένα μαθητούδι να γυρίσει άπραγο στο σπίτι του την εναρκτήρια ημέρα του μαθησιακού του βίου, τι σημασιοδοτήσεις θα παράγει γι’ αυτά η ματαίωση ενός τόσο σημαντικού και από πολλές πλευρές συμβολικού γεγονότος. Αυτοί ένα πράγμα βλέπουν μπροστά τους: Να μην ακούν καν τη λέξη «αξιολόγηση», να ζήσουν την ψευδαίσθηση της «ματαίωσης της χειραγώγησης των εκπαιδευτικών» και «της διάσωσης της εκπαίδευσης από την επίθεση των δυνάμεων της αγοράς». Οι συνδικαλιστές της ΔΟΕ δεν αισθάνονται καμιά ηθική αναστολή να χρησιμοποιούν ως ανθρώπινες ασπίδες τρυφερά μαθητούδια, προκειμένου να εκβιάσουν την πολιτεία και να αποφύγουν την τρισκατάρατη αξιολόγηση, αφού μέχρι τώρα το «κόλπο» έχει επιτυχή κατάληξη. Υπενθυμίζουμε ότι, πριν από λίγους μήνες, με τροπολογία της τελευταίας στιγμής, οι εκπαιδευτικοί εξαιρέθηκαν από τις διατάξεις περί αξιολόγησης των λοιπών δημοσίων υπαλλήλων.

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Η τοξική συζήτηση εξόδου από το ευρώ

του Γιώργου Παγουλάτου

Καθημερινή
19 Αυγούστου 2012

«Εχουν παραφρονήσει;» αναρωτιόταν σοβαρός αναλυτής, για την ατέλειωτη λιτανεία δηλώσεων περί εξόδου της Ελλάδας από το ευρώ. Δεν είναι μόνο οι αμέτρητοι πολιτικοί παράγοντες από τον ευρω-Βορρά. Είναι και οι αναπόφευκτοι οικονομολόγοι, που πιθανολογούν έξοδο μέσα στο 2013.

Πώς γίνεται να παραμένει ισχυρό ένα τόσο ολέθριο σενάριο, που καμιά πλευρά (Ευρωζώνη ή Ελλάδα) δεν θα είχε λόγους να επιθυμεί;

Για την Ελλάδα, η έξοδος θα ήταν προφανής καταστροφή. Αλλά και για την Ευρωζώνη, μια έξοδος της Ελλάδας θα σήμαινε κατακλυσμό. Θα την οδηγούσε σε αναγκαστική χρεοκοπία, επιβαρύνοντας τους Ευρωπαίους πολίτες. Θα προσλαμβανόταν ως αρχή διάλυσης του ευρώ. Θα σήμαινε χάος στην ευρωπαϊκή και διεθνή οικονομία. Θα προκαλούσε πανικό καταθετών στην περιφέρεια. Θα οδηγούσε σε ελέγχους στις κινήσεις κεφαλαίων, ανατρέποντας τη λειτουργία της ενιαίας αγοράς και τις ροές εμπορίου.

Θα ακολουθούσε ατέλειωτη σπέκουλα για το ποια χώρα θα είναι η επόμενη – και οι προβολείς θα έπεφταν στην Ιταλία. Τα αλλεπάλληλα στοιχήματα εξόδου θα λειτουργούσαν ως αυτεκπληρούμενη προφητεία. Σε κλίμα φόβου, οι επενδυτές θα εγκατέλειπαν όχι μόνο την περιφέρεια αλλά την ίδια την Ευρωζώνη, που θα βυθιζόταν στην ύφεση. Ορισμένοι κοστολογούν τις άμεσες οικονομικές επιπτώσεις πάνω από 1 τρισ. ευρώ.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τις οικονομικές επιπτώσεις, μια έξοδος/εξώθηση της Ελλάδας θα συνιστούσε πράγματι παραφροσύνη. Τότε γιατί θεωρείται τόσο πιθανή; Διότι, δυστυχώς, τα επιχειρήματα της άλλης πλευράς εμφανίζονται πολύ ισχυρά. Η Ελλάδα εμφανίζεται ως η χώρα που αδυνατεί να ορθοποδήσει.

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ECB limited and conditional lending is not 'what it takes'

by Piero Ghezzi

Vox
August 19, 2012

The ECB president, Mario Draghi, said he’d do “whatever it takes to save the euro”. This column asks what 'whatever it takes', means and whether the ECB is prepared to go that far. It argues that limited and conditional lending improves the odds of success but it is not the game changer needed.

There is broad agreement that the ECB is going to be the main actor in the potential resolution of the peripheral debt crisis. In principle, there are two avenues that the ECB could pursue in its efforts to avoid a full-blown crisis. First, it could ease monetary policy sufficiently to weaken the euro and generate inflation to facilitate growth. We think this route would not be sufficient in the near term and the ECB may perceive it as a breach of its mandate. As a result, it is not the focus of the market or the ECB. A second, more immediate task is to break down the vicious dynamics of higher yields and worsening debt dynamics that is affecting the systemically important peripheral European economies. Can the ECB achieve this objective?

As De Grauwe (2011) and Kopf (2011) have indicated, one of the main problems for the Eurozone is that, unlike the US, UK, or Japan, individual Eurozone countries effectively have 'foreign currency' debt in the sense that their own central banks cannot print the currency in which their debt is denominated. In that sense, the sovereigns lack a lender of last resort. The absence of a lender of last resort means that Eurozone governments are exposed to bouts of fear and distrust in the bond markets. These fears can trigger a liquidity crisis, which can easily turn into a solvency crisis, as higher interest rates and worsening debt dynamics can be self-fulfilling and effectively end up in default. Moreover, the Eurozone’s fixed exchange rate implies that the sudden stops (or reversal) of flows that are currently playing a key role in the European periphery will have a much bigger (negative) impact on economic activity.

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Η οικονομία γύρισε 10 χρόνια πίσω

του Ζώη Τσώλη

Το Βήμα
19 Αυγούστου 2012

Στα επίπεδα του 2003, όταν το εθνικό εισόδημα βρισκόταν στα 173 δισ. ευρώ και η προοπτική των Ολυμπιακών Αγώνων, οι κοινοτικοί πόροι και τα φθηνά δάνεια (σε σχέση με την εποχή της δραχμής) για επενδύσεις, στέγη και κατανάλωση έδιναν προοπτικές και γέμιζαν αισιοδοξία τους Ελληνες, έχει επιστρέψει η ελληνική οικονομία.

Όπως εκτιμούν έγκυροι αναλυτές, ύστερα από τέσσερα χρόνια βαθιάς ύφεσης το ΑΕΠ αναμένεται εφέτος ότι θα υποχωρήσει σε ποσοστό 6% και σε σταθερές τιμές θα διαμορφωθεί γύρω στα 170 δισ. ευρώ ενώ σε τρέχουσες τιμές γύρω στα 205 δισ. ευρώ.

Σύμφωνα με τον υπουργό Οικονομικών Γιάννη Στουρνάρα τα τελευταία εθνικολογιστικά στοιχεία έδειξαν ότι το ΑΕΠ θα συρρικνωθεί εφέτος γύρω στο 6% (χαμηλότερα από την πρόβλεψη της τρόικας για ύφεση 7%), ενώ ο ίδιος προβλέπει ότι το 2013 η οικονομία θα σταθεροποιηθεί.

Έτσι το τελευταίο σενάριο για τις μακροοικονομικές εξελίξεις διαμορφώνεται με βάση την πρόβλεψη για υποχώρηση του ΑΕΠ μόλις κατά 1% την επόμενη χρονιά.
Η ύφεση επιτείνει το πρόβλημα της ανεργίας και των εσόδων του κράτους, καθιστώντας ακόμη πιο δύσκολη την εξυπηρέτηση του δημοσίου χρέους, το οποία σύμφωνα με τα τελευταία στοιχεία του περασμένου Ιουνίου αυξήθηκε στα 303 δισ. ευρώ ή στο 150% του ΑΕΠ!

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