What Remains: On the European Union

by Mark Mazower

The Nation
September 24, 2012

Spinelli’s Dream

Baked by the Mediterranean sun beating down on the Tyrrhenian Sea, the volcanic islets of Santo Stefano and Ventotene lie some sixty miles off the Italian coast. Each is a few square miles of parched, treeless and windswept rock, inhabited since Roman times chiefly by lizards, seagulls and political prisoners. Santo Stefano is the smaller of the two, dominated even now by the weed-infested ruins of the extraordinary Bourbon prison built on Benthamite principles at the end of the eighteenth century. The slightly larger island, Ventotene, was the administrative headquarters of the prison complex under fascism, and it was there, with nothing but the sinister rock of Santo Stefano to disrupt the monotony of the horizon, that a small group of Italian political prisoners came together in the early years of World War II to diagnose the source of Europe’s ills and propose a better future. What emerged in the summer of 1941 would become known as the Ventotene Manifesto. Its main author, a young activist named Altiero Spinelli, would become a legendary figure in the pantheon of postwar Europeanism, a leading federalist and advocate of integration who, until his death in 1986, played a prominent role in the drive toward European union.

The starting point for the manifesto was naturally the failure of the League of Nations and the rise of fascism and Nazism. The text denounced both the league’s naïve confidence in international law and fascism’s idolatry of the state, and went on to argue that the national state itself was now a threat to the peace: Europe required not another League of Nations but full-blown federation. The Communists were criticized for preaching the virtues of class conflict, yet although Spinelli had recently broken with the party, what he offered was in many ways a kindred vision: “progressive forces” who believed in federation would act in the name of the “masses,” but they would be that minority of “serious internationalists” capable of acting decisively in a Leninist fashion to provide guidance in the critical moments when fascism and Nazism crumbled, moments “during which the popular masses are anxiously awaiting a new message.” The struggle was not going to be against this or that ideological current; rather, it would be against those “reactionary forces” that aimed to restore the power of the national state. The task was to make federation work, and if individual states wanted to go their own way, they would have to be compelled to see the truth. Only a European federation had the answers to the problems of mixed ethnicity and geography that had brought war to the continent, and twice, through Europe, to the world. Instead of spreading conflict, Europe should unify itself, even as humankind awaited “the more distant future when the political unity of the entire globe becomes a possibility.”

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This essay is adapted from Mark Mazower’s Governing the World: The History of an Idea, coming this month from the Penguin Press.

Τα μέτρα που (πάλι) διχάζουν

του Πάνου Καζάκου

Τα Νέα
5 Σεπτεμβρίου 2012

Τα νέα μέτρα που αποφάσισε η κυβέρνηση δίνουν συνέχεια στο δράμα μετάβασης που ζούμε. Από την έναρξη της κρίσης εξελίσσεται μια εν πολλοίς χαοτική αλλαγή στον τρόπο λειτουργίας του κράτους και της οικονομίας και στις σχέσεις ανάμεσα σε κράτος και κοινωνία. Ζούμε δηλαδή το αργό τέλος του μεταδικτατορικού (ή μεταπολεμικού;) κρατιστικού μας μοντέλου. Αυτή η διαδικασία θρυμματίζει προσδοκίες και σχέδια ζωής που στηρίχτηκαν σε σαθρές βάσεις.

Η κυβέρνηση αποφάσισε τελικά να εφαρμόσει τις δεσμεύσεις με την τρόικα (Μνημόνιο ΙΙ). Κατά τη γνώμη μου, η γενική κατεύθυνση που καθορίζεται στο Μνημόνιο είναι ορθή όπως και πολλά από τα αντίστοιχα μέτρα δημοσιονομικής εξυγίανσης. Το ίδιο ισχύει και για τις περισσότερες προτεινόμενες (και πάντοτε αναβαλλόμενες ή νοθευόμενες στην πράξη) μεταρρυθμίσεις.

Βέβαια, μόνα τους τα τελευταία μέτρα οδηγούν την οικονομία σε βαθύτερη ύφεση, γιατί απλώς αφαιρούν από το εισοδηματικό κύκλωμα 11,88 δισ. ευρώ τα επόμενα χρόνια. Αλλά αποτελούν προϋπόθεση για την εκταμίευση της επόμενης «δόσης» που μπορεί να σταθεροποιήσει την οικονομία, γιατί θα επιτρέψει την ανακεφαλαιοποίηση των τραπεζών, την πληρωμή των προμηθευτών του Δημοσίου και την κάλυψη μέρους του τρέχοντος ελλείμματος. Μαζί με άλλες πρωτοβουλίες για τη χρηματοδότηση προγραμμάτων από την ΕΤΕ, η εισροή πόρων (περίπου 32 δισ. ευρώ) μπορεί να αντισταθμίσει εν πολλοίς την υφεσιακή επίπτωση στην οικονομία, δηλαδή να σταματήσει τον κατήφορο. Ας προσθέσουμε ότι αν τελικά αποφευχθεί ο κίνδυνος εξόδου της χώρας από την ευρωζώνη, θα μειωθεί σημαντικά η αβεβαιότητα για το μέλλον της οικονομίας που επιδρά αρνητικά σε επενδυτικές αποφάσεις.

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Competitive advantages: A comparison of competitiveness and wealth

Economist
September 5, 2012

Switzerland tops the latest global competitiveness ranking of 144 countries by the World Economic Forum, best known for its annual shindig in Davos (a Swiss ski resort). It is closely followed by Singapore, while Finland has replaced Sweden in third place. That may be some comfort to the Finns, whose economy is lagging while Sweden’s is thriving. Of the big emerging economies, China remains on top, with Brazil moving up. The most striking fall is for the United States, which has dropped in the rankings for four years in a row. It is now seventh. The rankings, based on criteria such as availability of capital, flexibility of labour markets, economic stability, infrastructure and public services, also reveal the mountains that the troubled countries of southern Europe need to climb. Greece is in 96th place. Plotting the rankings against GDP per person reveals an unsurprising link: competitiveness brings wealth, but rich countries can most easily afford competitiveness. They can also squander it though. Outliers on the chart include countries that are more wealthy than their competitiveness suggests—or even vice-versa.

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Full Report

Greece’s Underground Economy Grows

24/7 Wall St.
September 5, 2012

Greece does not have the means to police its underground economy, which is considered very large compared to the size of the country. Austerity measures that cut the size of government will make enforcement of tax laws even more difficult. That is too bad because there is a lot of money to be had if only Greece could get cash from parts of its economy that are largely hidden from sight.

A new study by accounting firm Global Financial Integrity (GFI) claims:

The Greek economy lost US$261 billion to crime, corruption, and tax evasion from 2003-2011.

That may not seem a large amount by U.S. standards, but Greece’s gross domestic product was only $310 billion (nominal) last year and is shrinking rapidly.

GFI says that something strange has happened recently. There were “massive illicit inflows of US$90 billion in 2010 and US$109 billion in 2011.”

Expert Dr. Kar, who worked as a former senior economist at the International Monetary Fund before joining GFI reports:

Given the massive illicit flows into and out of Greece, there is every reason to believe that Greece’s underground economy is likely to continue growing at an increasing rate.

Greece’s economy has become so corrupt that it is worth the investment of criminal elements to mine the riches of potential illegal activity there.

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See also here and here

Οι Δύο Πληγές μας

του Παύλου Ελευθεριάδη

news247
5 Σεπτεμβρίου 2012

Η ελληνική χρεοκοπία του 2010-12 έχει προκαλέσει δύο πληγές. Η πρώτη είναι οικονομική και την νιώθουν πρώτα οι άνεργοι και οι νέοι αλλά και όλοι όσους τους έχει αγγίξει η αβεβαιότητα και φτώχεια. Η δεύτερη πληγή είναι ψυχική και την νιώθουμε όλοι το ίδιο, είναι η πληγή της αδικίας.

Ξέρουμε όλοι ότι στη ρίζα του το πρόβλημα της Ελλάδας είναι πρόβλημα δικαιοσύνης. Εδώ και πολλά χρόνια βλέπουμε ή υποψιαζόμαστε ότι η δημοκρατία μας κατήντησε έρμαιο αδίστακτων και αρπακτικών επιχειρηματιών και πολιτικών, αυτό που συχνά ονομάζουμε διαπλοκή αλλά συμπεριλαμβάνει και άλλους οργανωμένους επιτήδειους μικρότερου βεληνεκούς. Κάποιοι μας κλέβουν. Η επιρροή μεγάλων συνδικάτων του δημοσίου τομέα ήταν και παραμένει σκανδαλώδης. Οι ειδήσεις για τον Άκη Τσοχατζόπουλο, τον Τάσο Μαντέλη και τον Θεόδωρο Τσουκάτο επιβεβαίωσαν τους χειρότερους φόβους μας.

Για μεγάλο διάστημα πολλοί ανεχόντουσαν τις συμπεριφορές αυτές, ίσως γιατί τις θεωρούσαν αναγκαίο κακό σε οποιαδήποτε δημοκρατία, και μάλιστα μια με τα τραύματα τα δικά μας. Θεωρούσαμε ίσως ότι οι συνέπειες θα ήταν μικρές. Ίσως γι αυτό συμμετείχαν εν γνώσει τους στην αδικία και πάρα πολλοί ελεύθεροι επαγγελματίες, δικηγόροι, γιατροί, μηχανικοί και άλλοι, που δήλωναν σχεδόν μηδενικά εισοδήματα και απέφευγαν οποιαδήποτε άμεση φορολόγηση.

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The limits of a purely intra-euro rebalancing strategy

by Zsolt Darvas

Vox
September 5, 2012

The need to rebalance the debts of several Eurozone members is a major root of the current crisis. This column argues that a purely intra-euro rebalancing strategy has its limits and that a weaker euro would help. It urges the European Central Bank to adopt looser monetary policy, which is anyway justified in a highly recessionary environment.

The perceived failure of Greece, Portugal, and Spain to achieve sustainable external positions and economic growth inside the Eurozone is a major factor behind the current crisis. Their trade deficits should be turned to sizeable surpluses in which real exchange rate developments should play a role. Some adjustments, both in trade balances and real exchange rates, have already taken place in the past few years. Is the remaining adjustment a purely intra-Eurozone issue or does the external value of the euro play a role?

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Tax evasion in Greece: In flagrante

Economist
September 4, 2012

"If I could get everyone in this room to pay their taxes, I wouldn’t need to be here." So muttered a member of the troika last year, in a room filled with Greece’s great and good. The problem of tax evasion in Greece has been pointed out many times during the debt crisis: Christine Lagarde, the head of the IMF, got into hot water over the summer with her comments that she felt more sympathy with children in Africa than tax evaders in Greece. But eradicating a culture of tax evasion is no small task, as a new paper by Nikolaos Artavanis of Virginia Tech and Adair Morse and Margarita Tsoutsoura of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business underlines.

The trio use a novel technique to calculate levels of tax evasion in Greece. The authors look at a dataset from a large Greek bank, which contains information on individual borrowers’ credit applications between 2003 and 2010. Taken at face value, the data for self-employed borrowers make no sense. On average, self-employed Greeks spend 82% of their monthly reported income—ie, the amount they declare to the tax office—on servicing debt payments. Some professions, like lawyers and doctors, appear to spend more than 100% of their income on debt servicing.

That cannot be right: a rough rule of thumb is that a third of income should go on debt payments. Banks would not lend at these steepling debt-to-income ratios. Weirder still, the delinquency rates on loans do not seem to vary in line with these ratios: self-employed Greek doctors are both the most indebted profession and the one with the lowest delinquency probabilities.

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Read the Paper

Greece's Golden Dawn isn't a political party – it's more like a criminal gang

by Yiannis Baboulias

Guardian
September 4, 2012

The Greek far-right party Golden Dawn has been flirting with an "outlaw" rhetoric lately. Appealing to a disgruntled electorate, its MPs constantly try to point out that the Golden Dawn is unlike any other political party in Greece. They are right in this respect. In fact, they are not a party at all: they are acting like a gang of criminal thugs, and it should not be beyond the pale to declare their organisation as such.

"We feel disgusted in the parliament," said their leader, Nikos Mihaloliakos, in a speech to his followers on 25 August. "If they want us to, we can abandon it at any given moment and take to the streets. There, they shall see what the Golden Dawn is really about, they will see what battle means, they will see what struggle means, they will see what bayonets sharpened every night mean". Holding torches, they shouted "blood, honour, Golden Dawn" – a direct translation from the German "Blut und Ehre", the motto once carried by the Nazi SA. "It's you who are our Storm Detachments (Sturmabteilung). Let them come after you!" he continued, in his usual Nazi-inspired terms. Singing their official hymn "Raise the flags high" – again, a direct translation of the Nazi stormtroopers hymn "Die fachne hoch" – young men and women call for open, violent conflict both with the state and with any opponents on the ground.

An organisation with explicit ties to neo-nazism, advocating violence and attacking immigrants and anti-racist marches in the street: does this sound like a legitimate democratic party?

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Can Draghi Be Believed?

by Simon Tilford

Project Syndicate
September 3, 2012

Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, has repeatedly claimed that the ECB will do everything necessary to save the euro. Nothing has been formally agreed yet, but the ECB is expected to announce a new government bond-buying program following next week’s meeting of its Governing Council. Will it work?

To have a significant impact on Italian and Spanish borrowing costs, the latest effort must be big enough to dispel the convertibility risk that underlies the extreme polarization of government bond yields across the eurozone: investors are loathe to hold Spanish and Italian debt, because they fear that both countries might be forced to leave the currency union. Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that the ECB will do enough to persuade investors that membership is unequivocally forever, not least because Germany’s Bundesbank opposes any open-ended commitment to capping borrowing costs.

Spain, Italy, and the eurozone periphery face unprecedentedly high real borrowing costs, which are preventing a recovery in investment and hence economic growth. Without a return to growth, they cannot quell investors’ doubts about their fiscal sustainability and their banks’ solvency.

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Greece as a Precautionary Tale of the Welfare State

by Aristides N. Hatzis

Chapter from the collective volume
After the Welfare State
edited by Tom G. Palmer
Atlas Economic Research Foundation
Washington, DC, 2012

Few contemporary democracies off er tales of institutional failure as startling as that of Greece. Despite a turbulent political history in the twentieth century, the Greek economy gained ground during decades of actual wealth creation, until the country’s main parties started to compete on the basis of welfare statism, based on populism and patronage. Law and economics scholar Aristides Hatzis shows how short-term pursuit of political advantage through statist policies generated corruption, indebtedness, and political collapse. Hatzis is professor of the philosophy of law and theory of institutions at the University of Athens and writes about the Greek crisis at GreekCrisis.net.

Modern Greece has become a symbol of economic and political bankruptcy, a natural experiment in institutional failure. It’s not easy for a single country to serve as a textbook example of so many institutional defi ciencies, rigidities, and distortions, yet the Greek government has managed it. The case of Greece is a precautionary tale for all others.

Greece used to be considered something of a success story. One could even argue that Greece was a major success story for several decades. Greece’s average rate of growth for half a century (1929–1980) was 5.2 percent; during the same period Japan grew at only 4.9 percent.

These numbers are more impressive if you take into consideration that the political situation in Greece during these years was anything but normal. From 1929 to 1936 the political situation was anomalous with coups, heated political strife, short-lived dictatorships, and a struggle to assimilate more than 1.5 million refugees from Asia Minor (about one-third of Greece’s population at the time). From 1936 to 1940 Greece had a rightist dictatorship with many similarities to the other European dictatorships of the time and during World War II (1940–1944) Greece was among the most devastated nations in terms of percentage of human casualties. Right aft er the end of the war a ferocious and devastating Civil War took place (in two stages: 1944 and 1946–1949) aft er an insurgency organized by the Communist Party. From 1949 to 1967 Greece off ered a typical example of a paternalistic illiberal democracy, deficient in rule of law, and on April 21, 1967, a military junta took power and ruled Greece until July 1974, when Greece became a constitutional liberal democracy. The economy of Greece managed to grow despite wars, insurgencies, dictatorships, and a turbulent political life.

Seven years aft er embracing constitutional democracy the nine (then) members of the European Community (EC) accepted Greece as its tenth member (even before Spain and Portugal). Why? It was mostly a political decision but it was also based on decades of economic growth, despite all the setbacks and obstacles. When Greece entered the EC, the country’s public debt stood at 28 percent of GDP; the budget defi cit was less than 3 percent of GDP; and the unemployment rate was 2–3 percent.

But that was not the end of the story.

You can read the rest of the chapter here

or you can download the entire volume (free):

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Θα σε ξανάβρω στους μπαχτσέδες

του Γρηγόρη Φαρμάκη

Protagon.gr
3 Σεπτεμβρίου 2012

Όταν οι τεχνοκράτες της τρόικας, έμπειροι από αποστολές σε πρώην σοβιετικές δημοκρατίες του Καυκάσου και χώρες της υποσαχάριας Αφρικής, έμαθαν ότι έρχονται στην Ελλάδα, το θεώρησαν ευνοϊκή μετάθεση• στο κάτω-κάτω η Ελλάδα είναι μια χώρα δυτική. Όταν συνειδητοποίησαν την πραγματικότητα, είμαι σίγουρος ότι αναφώνησαν έκπληκτοι: «Μα, ανήκετε στη Δύση;» Δεν ήξεραν ότι είχαν έρθει σε μια χώρα που μιλάει ακόμα αυτάρεσκα για κουτόφραγκους κι αμερικανάκια. Ούτε εμείς βέβαια. Καθώς η κρίση ξεβράζει τα συντρίμια της παρακμής μας, αγανακτισμένους Υδραίους φοροφυγάδες εδώ, τυφλούς που είδαν το φως τους με τον πρώτο θαυματουργό έλεγχο εκεί, άξιες θυγατέρες που διορίζονται στη βουλή παραπέρα, και άλλα πατρογονικά ήθη κι έθιμα της φυλής, κι εμείς συχνά αναρρωτιόμαστε: «Ανήκομεν εις την Δύσιν;»

Η απάντηση βέβαια έχει δοθεί αρμοδίως και από τα πιο επίσημα χείλη. Την Τρίτη 29 Μαϊου του 2012, επέτειο ιστορική, αλλά και με ένα τρόπο συναφή με το θέμα μας - μερικοί υποστηρίζουν ότι την Τρίτη 29 Μαϊου του 1453 δόθηκε ιστορική απάντηση στο γεωγραφικό ερώτημα - ο Αλέξης ο Τσίπρας, μιλώντας σε ρωσικό τηλεοπτικό δίκτυο, δήλωνε: «Δεν μπορούμε να αποδεχθούμε το πεπαλαιωμένο δόγμα ότι η Ελλάδα ανήκει στη Δύση». Λίγους μήνες νωρίτερα, τον Οκτώβριο του 2011, την ίδια ακριβώς απάντηση, και στο ίδιο ακριβώς συγκείμενο, είχε δώσει και ο Γιώργος Καρατζαφέρης: «Αυτή η τυφλή προσήλωση στο δόγμα “ανήκομεν εις την δύσιν” μας έχει οδηγήσει εδώ που βρισκόμαστε σήμερα».

Μπορεί βέβαια και οι δύο να αντέκρουσαν την γνωστή ρήση του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή δήθεν ως δόγμα εξωτερικής πολιτικής, όμως η πολιτική ρητορική είναι η πολύ υψηλή τέχνη των πολύ χαμηλών συμβολισμών για να περιοριζόμαστε στο αυτολεξεί νόημα. Πίσω από την πρόφαση της εξωτερικής πολιτικής κρύβονται θελελιώδεις πολιτικές επιλογές που άπτονται της ίδιας μας της Εθνικής Αλήθειας. Οι δυο λαοπρόβλητοι ηγέτες ποντάρουν με ασφάλεια στο ότι ίσως η «μη-Δύση» μάς ταιριάζει ιστορικά και πολιτισμικά περισσότερο.

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Germans write off Greece, says poll

Financial Times
September 2, 2012

Only a quarter of Germans think Greece should stay in the eurozone or get more help from other countries in the currency union, a Financial Times/Harris poll has found.

The overwhelming verdict highlights Angela Merkel’s domestic dilemma as she comes under pressure in Europe to agree more time or money for Greece to get its €174bn second bailout back on track.

Negative German sentiment, detailed in the poll conducted in August, stands in marked contrast to that in Italy and Spain, where respondents were far more reluctant to cut Athens loose.

The diverging views pose a big challenge to EU leaders who this month must again grapple with how to deal with a new Greek government poised to ask for two more years to implement painful economic and government reforms demanded by international lenders as part of their three-year bailout programme.

Senior officials estimate that the Greek programme has already slipped by up to €20bn since it was agreed in February because of a worsening economic climate and official stasis in Athens through two rounds of divisive national elections. A decision on how to fill that gap must be made before an already-overdue €31bn aid payment is distributed next month.

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U.S. Companies Brace for an Exit From the Euro by Greece

New York Times
September 2, 2012

Even as Greece desperately tries to avoid defaulting on its debt, American companies are preparing for what was once unthinkable: that Greece could soon be forced to leave the euro zone.

Bank of America Merrill Lynch has looked into filling trucks with cash and sending them over the Greek border so clients can continue to pay local employees and suppliers in the event money is unavailable. Ford has configured its computer systems so they will be able to immediately handle a new Greek currency.

No one knows just how broad the shock waves from a Greek exit would be, but big American banks and consulting firms have also been doing a brisk business advising their corporate clients on how to prepare for a splintering of the euro zone.

That is a striking contrast to the assurances from European politicians that the crisis is manageable and that the currency union can be held together. On Thursday, the European Central Bank will consider measures that would ease pressure on Europe’s cash-starved countries.

JPMorgan Chase, though, is taking no chances. It has already created new accounts for a handful of American giants that are reserved for a new drachma in Greece or whatever currency might succeed the euro in other countries.

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In Pivotal Week for Euro Zone, a Test for the Central Bank’s Leader

New York Times
September 2, 2012

The last time Mario Draghi addressed the news media after a meeting of the European Central Bank, on Aug. 2, he disappointed investors who wanted him to crack his whip and immediately bring bond markets to heel. The markets dropped even before Mr. Draghi was done speaking.

Only in subsequent days and weeks did the bond markets calm down, as investors evidently absorbed his underlying message: that the central bank intended to take meaningful action against the euro debt crisis even if quick remedies were not possible.

But this Thursday, when the central bank meets again, Mr. Draghi, the bank’s president, could have a far harder time reconciling the expectations of twitchy financial markets with the limitations of his power. Although investors are counting on bold action, analysts say the bank probably needs more time to resolve internal differences and deliver on a promise to use its financial clout to tame runaway borrowing costs for the most troubled euro zone countries.

“Market expectation of Draghi’s ability to maneuver may be exaggerated,” said Marie Diron, a former economist at the central bank who advises the consulting firm Ernst & Young. “That could lead to a sell-off.”

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My one piece of advice for Mr Draghi

by Wolfgang Münchau

Financial Times
September 2, 2012

It has been the eurozone’s misfortune that governments become complacent the very minute the European Central Bank starts to act. We saw it last year when the ECB injected €1tn into the banking system, and when the crisis resolution process immediately stalled. You see it now in Spain, where Mariano Rajoy is refusing to make a formal application for a full rescue programme. The fall in bond spreads has taken the pressure away.

But nowhere is the onset of complacency more evident than in the ongoing discussion about a banking union. I always suspected that Germany would turn out to be the stumbling block. And I was not surprised to read Wolfgang Schäuble in the Financial Times on Friday arguing that the ECB cannot conceivably supervise 6,000 banks – which the European Commission will propose next week. Michel Barnier, finance commissioner, says it makes no sense to limit a system of bank supervision to the largest banks. Northern Rock, Dexia and Bankia would all have fallen outside the remit of a central European regulator. The largest eurozone banks are much less of a problem than the countless undercapitalised regional banks run by people with no understanding of the risks they are taking.

Germany’s public banks, savings banks and mutual banks are lobbying hard not to fall under a European system. Their business models rely on a friendly neighbourhood regulator looking the other way. If you imposed stringent controls on the German banking systems, the cosy relationship between industry and banks would be disturbed. The Germans see Mr Barnier’s proposal as an attack on their economic model.

If the German position prevails – and it may well do – the project of a banking union will have irrevocably failed. There will be something called a banking union, announced and celebrated. The EU will congratulate itself, but it will be largely irrelevant to the workings of the financial sector. The eurozone will remain a monetary union with nationally supervised and crisis-prone banks for the foreseeable future.

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Οι δύο δρόμοι

του Στάθη Ν. Καλύβα

Καθημερινή
2 Σεπτεμβρίου 2012

Κεντρική θέση στην ιστορία της μεταπολίτευσης κατέχει ο τρόπος με τον οποίο αναπτύχθηκε η σχέση κράτους και κοινωνίας. Πρόκειται για μια σχέση που βασίστηκε στο συνδυασμό τριών στοιχείων: στην ενθάρρυνση της λεηλασίας του δημόσιου πλούτου, στην απρόσκοπτη παρεμπόδιση της εφαρμογής των νόμων και στην προσδοκία της απλόχερης παροχής δημοσίων υπηρεσιών και αγαθών. Για να περιγράψουν τη σχέση αυτή εύληπτα και συνοπτικά, οι ιστορικοί του μέλλοντος ίσως χρησιμοποιήσουν τον όρο «κράτος α λα καρτ».

Η λειτουργία της κρατικής εξουσίας υπήρξε «α λα καρτ» γιατί καθόριζε τις υποχρεώσεις και τα δικαιώματα των πολιτών όχι με γενικούς κανόνες, αλλά με κριτήριο τις ιδιαίτερες απαιτήσεις και διαθέσεις τους. Οι πολίτες με τη σειρά τους απαιτούσαν συνεχώς παρεμβάσεις από το κράτος, μολονότι υπονόμευαν με τις πράξεις τους τη δυνατότητά του να παρεμβαίνει αποτελεσματικά. Η απαίτηση αυτή είχε, μάλιστα, τον χαρακτήρα του αυτονόητου και η τεράστια αντίφαση που εμπεριείχε δεν γινόταν καν αντιληπτή. Σύνθημα της φιλοσοφίας αυτής, μια κραυγή: «Πού είναι το κράτος;»

Τα τρία αυτά στοιχεία είναι αναπόσπαστα συνδεδεμένα μεταξύ τους. Η λεηλασία του κρατικού πλούτου δομήθηκε πάνω σε μια σιωπηρή τριμερή συμφωνία: ανθρώπων απ’ όλα ανεξαιρέτως τα κοινωνικά στρώματα, πολιτικών κομμάτων και ΜΜΕ. Μόνο έτσι μπορεί να ερμηνευθεί ο απίστευτος αριθμός των πλαστών συντάξεων και η ευκολία με την οποία οργανώθηκε η απάτη. Βέβαια, η δυναμική διεκδίκηση γενικών δικαιωμάτων και ειδικών προνομίων αποτελεί εγγενές στοιχείο της πολιτικής και όχι ελληνική ιδιαιτερότητα. Σύμφωνα με τον γνωστό αφορισμό του Harold Lasswell, «πολιτική είναι το ποιος παίρνει τι, πότε και πώς». Ομως, στις οργανωμένες κοινωνίες, η διεκδίκηση αυτή γίνεται μέσα στο πλαίσιο θεσμοθετημένων κανόνων, με αυστηρές κυρώσεις για όσους επιχειρούν την παράκαμψή τους. Στην Ελλάδα, αντίθετα, η παρεμπόδιση της εφαρμογής των νόμων έλαβε μορφή κυρίαρχης ιδεολογίας, βρίσκοντας στήριξη σε μια αριστερόστροφη αντίληψη που ερμήνευε την οποιαδήποτε διεκδίκηση ως επαναστατική πράξη. Πρόκειται για μιαν αντίληψη που καλλιεργήθηκε αρχικά στα φοιτητικά αμφιθέατρα, για να γίνει σιγά σιγά κομμάτι της εθνικής συνείδησης χάρη στην ακάματη δραστηριότητα κρατικοδίαιτων διανοουμένων, καλλιτεχνών και δημοσιογράφων.

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Back to basics

του Μάνου Ματσαγγάνη

Protagon.gr
2 Σεπτεμβρίου 2012

Το πρώτο δεδομένο αφορά τον αριθμό όσων απασχολούνται στο Δημόσιο και στις ΔΕΚΟ. Είναι γνωστό (τεκμηριώνεται μεταξύ άλλων στις σχετικές μελέτες του Χρυσάφη Ιορδάνογλου) ότι το μέγεθος της δημόσιας απασχόλησης αυξήθηκε θεαματικά τη δεκαετία του 1980, λιγότερο θεαματικά στη συνέχεια, ενώ ανέβηκε ξανά απότομα την πενταετία 2004-2009. Επειδή κατά την πενταετία Καραμανλή δεν έγινε αισθητή κάποια ποσοτική επέκταση ή ποιοτική βελτίωση των δημοσίων υπηρεσιών, δικαιούται κανείς να θεωρεί ότι οι σχετικοί διορισμοί ήταν κατά κανόνα εντελώς περιττοί.

Επί πλέον, το 2010 - εν μέσω Μνημονίου! - ο αριθμός των δημοσίων υπαλλήλων έμεινε στάσιμος, παρότι συνταξιοδοτήθηκαν 53.400 δημόσιοι υπάλληλοι (άρα η κυβέρνηση Παπανδρέου διόρισε άλλους τόσους). Το 2011 αποχώρησαν 42.000 δημόσιοι υπάλληλοι ενώ προσελήφθησαν 12.600 (δηλ. κάπως καλύτερα αναλογία – αλλά και αυτή η αναλογία απέχει αρκετά από το 5:1 που ψήφισε η Βουλή).

Το δεύτερο δεδομένο αφορά τους μισθούς στο δημόσιο τομέα. Είναι επίσης γνωστό ότι την περίοδο πριν από την κρίση οι μισθοί των δημοσίων υπαλλήλων αυξήθηκαν σταθερά, ενώ εκείνοι των υπαλλήλων ΔΕΚΟ θεαματικά. Συγκεκριμένα, με βάση τα στοιχεία της ΤτΕ, τα ποσοστά αύξησης των μισθών (σε πραγματικούς όρους, δηλ. πάνω από τον πληθωρισμό) τη δεκαετία 2000-2009 ήταν +22,7% για το Δημόσιο και +56,8% για τις ΔΕΚΟ (έναντι +24,4% για τον μη τραπεζικό ιδιωτικό τομέα). Εντός του Δημοσίου, η αύξηση δεν ήταν ομοιόμορφη. Τα σχετικά στοιχεία είναι δυσεύρετα (γεγονός όχι άσχετο με το πρόβλημα). Πάντως, είναι γνωστό ότι π.χ. για τους πανεπιστημιακούς υπήρξε ασήμαντη, ενώ π.χ. για τους δικαστικούς σημαντική. Σύμφωνα με ανεπιβεβαίωτες πληροφορίες που έχουν διαρρεύσει από το Υπουργείο Οικονομικών, η μέση δαπάνη μισθοδοσίας των δικαστικών είναι σήμερα περίπου 6.500 ευρώ το μήνα.

Το τρίτο δεδομένο αφορά τη μεταχείριση των ανέργων. Από τα τελευταία στοιχεία της ΕλΣτατ γνωρίζουμε ότι ο αριθμός των ανέργων το Μάιο ήταν περίπου 1.150.000. Από τα τελευταία στοιχεία του ΟΑΕΔ γνωρίζουμε ότι ο αριθμός των εγγεγραμμένων ανέργων τον Ιούλιο ήταν 795.000, ενώ από αυτούς μόνο 187.000 ελάμβαναν επίδομα ανεργίας. (Το χειμώνα ο αριθμός των επιδοτουμένων αυξάνεται, αφού οι κύριοι ωφελημένοι του επιδόματος ανεργίας όπως λειτουργεί σήμερα είναι οι εργοδότες σε κλάδους με εποχική απασχόληση - κυρίως ιδιοκτήτες ξενοδοχείων και φροντιστηρίων).

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Can Europe Survive the Rise of the Rest?

by Timothy Garton Ash

New York Times
September 1, 2012

Who won the most medals at the Olympics? Europe. Who has the largest economy in the world? Europe again. And where do most people want to go on holiday? Europe, of course. On many measures of power, the European Union belongs with the United States and China in a global Big Three. Yet say that to officials in Beijing, Washington or any other world capital today and they would probably laugh out loud. As European leaders stagger into yet another round of crisis summitry, this potential superpower is widely viewed as the sick man of the developed world.

Why? The flawed design of the euro zone has made Europe’s recession more acute than America’s, and a collapse of the euro zone would drag the rest of the world economy down with it. But why haven’t Europeans shown the political will to save the euro zone by moving toward closer fiscal and political union? What happened to the forces that drove the project of European unification forward over the last 60 years? And, if those have faded, where might Europeans find new inspiration?

As I recently argued in Foreign Affairs, the five great drivers of European unification since the 1950s have now either disappeared or lost much of their energy.

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Justin Gabbard

Why A Grexit Is Not Going To Happen

by George Kesarios

Seeking Alpha
August 31, 2012

The recent Grexit rhetoric is not restricted to German officials, but to all European politicians across the board. My guess is that a lot of it has to do more with internal consumption politics in many European countries than with reality.

To try to make you understand why a Grexit is next to impossible, let's think about what will happen if Greece is actually kicked out of the European Monetary Union (EMU).

Aside from the legal issues, if Greece is indeed kicked out of the euro, that means that the deposits in euros which Greek citizens have in Greek banks will have no value. Actually, they will have some value, but not the current value of the euro.

This also means that if another country were to be kicked out of the euro, then the deposits of that country's citizens will also be worth something other than the euro's current value. In both cases, the value of the deposits will be worth a whole lot less.

As you understand, if Greece were to indeed be kicked out of the EMU, then that would set a precedent and that would mean that other countries, under certain circumstances, would also be able to be expelled. So if Greece gets kicked out, my hunch is that we would see a bank run of historic proportions all across Europe.

Which means that the euro would collapse, because depositors and investors would be running scared, speculating who will be next, probably buying dollars in the short term. In any case, I foresee a massive exodus from the euro across the board, including investors and depositors in Germany.

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How to Prevent Euro Zone Contagion

by Kristina Peterson

Wall Street Journal
August 31, 2012

European Central Bank President Mario Draghi canceled his plans this week to attend the Kansas City Federal Reserve’s economic symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyo. But central bankers and academics gathering are discussing the crisis he faces.

Preventing the financial turmoil in one country from spreading to others — a process called contagion — requires different measures in the euro zone than in other regions, finds Kristin Forbes, an economics professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology‘s Sloan School of Management, in a paper to be presented at the conference on Friday.

Because the 17 countries in the euro zone share a currency and a central bank, they can’t individually adjust to shocks outside their borders through currency devaluation or monetary policy. That makes it more important for euro-zone countries to maintain flexible economies that can adjust quickly, she writes. That also may provide a little more justification for taking policy actions to help stop a chain of bad events that could unleash widespread damage, she writes. European leaders have been arguing for many years over what to do to stop the spread of rising government bond yields, capital flight, bank losses and other financial problems through the region.

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