IMF Completes Fifth Review Under Extended Fund Facility Arrangement for Greece and Approves €3.41 Billion Disbursement

International Monetary Fund
Press Release No.14/254
May 30, 2014

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today completed the fifth review of Greece’s performance under an economic program supported by an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement. The completion of this review enables the disbursement of SDR 3.01 billion (about €3.41 billion, or US$4.64 billion), which would bring total disbursements under the arrangement to SDR 10.22 billion (about €11.58 billion, or US$15.75 billion).

In completing the review, the Executive Board approved a waiver of nonobservance of the performance criterion on domestic arrears, given the corrective actions taken. In light of the delays in program implementation, the Board also approved the authorities’ request for rephasing three disbursements evenly over the remaining reviews in 2014.

The EFF arrangement, which was approved on March 15, 2012 (see Press Release No. 12/85), is part of a joint package of financing with euro area member states amounting to about €173 billion over four years. It entails exceptional access to IMF resources equivalent to about 2,159 percent of Greece’s quota.

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Ενδεχόμενος δόλος

του Αριστείδη Χατζή

Τα Νέα
29 Μαΐου 2014

Μετά το εντυπωσιακό αλλά αναμενόμενο 9,4% της Χρυσής Αυγής ξεκίνησε και πάλι η συζήτηση για τον τρόπο με το οποίο θα αντιμετωπίσουμε το φαινόμενο. Η συζήτηση αυτή είναι ειλικρινής αλλά είναι και εκ του πονηρού. Όπως και να το κάνουμε, οι 537.000 ψήφοι βάζουν σε πειρασμό ακόμα και αριστερό Άγιο. Δεν σου πάει η καρδιά να εγκαταλείψεις έτσι εύκολα τις παραστρατημένες λαϊκές τάξεις – κι αυτές θύματα είναι! Άλλωστε, πάντα μπορούν να χρησιμεύσουν σε δεύτερους γύρους. Όσο για τη Δεξιά… Εκεί δεν χρειάζονται τα κροκοδείλια δάκρυα, ούτε έχουν τέτοιου είδους αναστολές. Είναι έτοιμοι να τους δεχτούν πίσω στο μαντρί και να σφάξουν και τον μόσχο τον σιτευτό.

Είναι ελάχιστοι αυτοί που έχουν το πολιτικό θάρρος να δουν την αλήθεια κατάματα και να αναγνωρίσουν το Τέρας. Είναι ελάχιστοι αυτοί που θα αποδώσουν ευθύνες κόβοντας τις οπορτουνιστικές γέφυρες και αναλαμβάνοντας, επιτέλους, τον παιδαγωγικό ρόλο που πρέπει να παίζει η πολιτική σε μια ευρωπαϊκή φιλελεύθερη δημοκρατία. Αυτός ο ρόλος περιλαμβάνει την υποχρέωση να ειπωθούν κάποια πράγματα με το όνομά τους.

Οι ψηφοφόροι της Χρυσής Αυγής μοιράζονται την ηθική ευθύνη για τις πράξεις των πλέον σκληρών μελών της οργάνωσης. Δεν ξέρω ποια θα είναι η δικαστική πορεία της υπόθεσης. Ξέρω όμως ότι υπάρχουν νεκροί και πολλοί τραυματίες (σωματικά και ψυχικά). Δεν ξέρω αν η Χρυσή Αυγή είναι εγκληματική οργάνωση. Είναι όμως μια ναζιστική οργάνωση, με φασιστικές μεθόδους δράσης και καθαρόαιμα εθνικοσοσιαλιστική ιδεολογία.

Εσείς λοιπόν που την ψηφίσατε είστε ηθικά υπεύθυνοι για όσα έκανε, όσα κάνει και όσα θα κάνει αυτή η ναζιστική οργάνωση. Αν μου απαντήσετε ότι δεν είστε ναζιστές και δεν εγκρίνετε όλες τις πράξεις ή το σύνολο των «ιδεών» της οργάνωσης, αυτό δεν θα μειώσει την ευθύνη σας. Γνωρίζετε πολύ καλά πλέον τι είναι η Χρυσή Αυγή και τι είναι ικανή να κάνει. Δεν έχετε καμία αμφιβολία για την ιδεολογία της και τους στόχους της. Οι «καλές σας προθέσεις» θυμίζουν τον ενδεχόμενο δόλο στο ποινικό δίκαιο: o δράστης δεν επιδιώκει το αποτέλεσμα της πράξης του αλλά το αποδέχεται, δεν τον ενοχλεί ιδιαίτερα.

Οι ψηφοφόροι της Χρυσής Αυγής δεν όπλισαν το χέρι που σκότωσε έναν Πακιστανό και έναν Έλληνα. Είναι όμως έτοιμοι να δείξουν κατανόηση για τον δράστη «που τον προκάλεσαν». Δεν λύντσαραν οι ίδιοι μετανάστες, αλλά νιώθουν ανακούφιση που υπάρχουν άλλοι να κάνουν τη βρώμικη δουλειά γι’ αυτούς. Όταν τους φέρεις προ των ευθυνών τους, η απάντηση είναι ανάλογης ποιότητας με τις πολιτικές επιλογές τους: ρευστοποιούν την έννοια της ευθύνης, σχετικοποιούν τη βία, ισοπεδώνουν τα πάντα.

Μην σας κάνει εντύπωση ο αριθμός τους. Νομίζω ότι το 9,4% συνιστά μάλλον αποτυχία για τη Χρυσή Αυγή, καθώς το κοινό στο οποίο απευθύνεται είναι πολύ ευρύτερο: από τους ψεκασμένους (το 1/3 του πληθυσμού!) που ζουν στη ζώνη του λυκόφωτος έως εκείνους που ακόμα και σήμερα δεν έχουν αντιληφθεί τι συνέβη στην Ελλάδα τα τελευταία τέσσερα χρόνια, ούτε κατανοήσει τις παθογένειες των τελευταίων σαράντα ετών. Δυστυχώς, όμως, θα πρέπει να προσθέσουμε στον ανορθολογισμό και στην πολιτική άγνοια και άλλα, πιο σκοτεινά χαρακτηριστικά του μέσου Έλληνα, όπως τον ρατσισμό και τον αντισημιτισμό.

Τα αποτελέσματα της μεγάλης παγκόσμιας έρευνας για τον αντισημιτισμό που διεξήγαγε η ADL και ανακοινώθηκαν στα μέσα του μήνα ήταν ταυτόχρονα αποκαλυπτικά και εξευτελιστικά για τη χώρα μας. Σύμφωνα με την έρευνα, το 69% των Ελλήνων υιοθετούν αντισημιτικά στερεότυπα. Το 69% (δύο στους τρεις!) είναι υπερβολικά και θλιβερά πολύ αν το συγκρίνουμε με το 19% της Αμερικανικής Ηπείρου, το 24% της Δυτικής και το 34% της Ανατολικής Ευρώπης. Με το 22% της Ασίας, το 14% της Ωκεανίας και το 23% της Υποσαχάριας Αφρικής. Αλλά βέβαια είναι απόλυτα συγκρίσιμο με το 74% της Μέσης Ανατολής και της Βόρειας Αφρικής!

Υπάρχουν βέβαια αντισημίτες σε όλον τον κόσμο. Παντού όμως είναι η μειοψηφία, μια θλιβερή μειοψηφία μικρή ή μεγάλη. Στην Ελλάδα, αντιθέτως, οι ρατσιστές αντισημίτες είναι η μεγάλη πλειονότητα. Είναι η δεξαμενή της Χρυσής Αυγής.

Και τώρα τι κάνουμε; Πώς αντιμετωπίζουμε αυτό το φαινόμενο; Υπάρχουν απαντήσεις, και θα επιχειρήσω να τις δώσω λίαν προσεχώς.

* Ο Αριστείδης Χατζής είναι αναπληρωτής καθηγητής Φιλοσοφίας Δικαίου και Θεωρίας Θεσμών στο Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών.

Εδώ θα βρείτε το άρθρο (όπως δημοσιεύθηκε στα Νέα)

Εδώ θα βρείτε το άρθρο στην ιστοσελίδα των Νέων.

Εδώ θα βρείτε το δεύτερο άρθρο μου στα Νέα για το ίδιο θέμα. (δημοσιεύθηκε ως συνέχεια του παρόντος κειμένου)

Εδώ θα βρείτε ένα παλαιότερο άρθρο μου με τίτλο "Γράμμα προς ένα νέο οπαδό της Χρυσής Αυγής"

Εδώ θα βρείτε ένα ακόμα άρθρο μου για το Ναζισμό ("Οι Ζωές των Ανθρώπων")

Εδώ θα βρείτε το Index of Antisemitism του ADL (για την Ελλάδα εδώ)

του Δημήτρη Χαντζόπουλου (Τα Νέα, 21/5/2014)

Pandora’s Ballot Box

by Alexander Skouras

AtlasOne
May 28, 2014

In ancient Greek mythology, Pandora’s Box was a container filled with evil. On May 25 Europeans went to the polls where they opened Pandora’s ballot box, which contained an evil long thought to be forgotten: a national socialist (Nazi) party.

The vote count revealed that three representatives of Greece’s Golden Dawn had been elected to the European Parliament. Many Europeans won’t draw the connection immediately, but soon these members of the most brutal, hateful, and bigoted political group the Parliament has seen in 35 years will be receiving tax-funded salaries.

Since its previous electoral success, of course, Golden Dawn has tried to hide its pro-Nazi past. But evidence of its worldview is abundant and irrefutable.

Golden Dawn’s rise from a tiny group of radical Hitler-sympathizers to the third largest party in Greece occurred when the Greek economy was collapsing. The origins of this crisis are well-known and well-documented: excessive borrowing, low productivity, corruption, and a profligate welfare state. At the height of the crisis the entire nation was angry; the people felt betrayed by their political elites. The Nazi party arose from the need to blame outsiders and to feel special.

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Golden Dawn: The fox in Europe’s hen house

by Takis S. Pappas

Policy Network
May 27, 2014

Golden Dawn is a racist neo-fascist party, openly hostile to representative institutions and political pluralism. After coming third in this weekend’s elections, the question arises of how to confront it?

Never mind that he bears a swastika tattoo on his arm, denies the existence of the Holocaust, and considers Hitler “a great social reformer” and “military genius”. At voting for the first round of Greece’s municipal and country-district elections on May 18th, Ilias Kasidiaris, spokesman of the neo-fascist Golden Dawn party and its candidate for the Athens mayoralty, was the choice of 16.1 percent of the voters. On the same day, Ilias Panagiotaros, another party strongman who was candidate for the governorship of the Attica region, gained 11.1 percent of the vote. Nationwide, Golden Dawn was estimated to enjoy the support of about 8 percent of the voters. It was an underestimation. At the elections for the European Parliament on May 25th, Golden Dawn won a stunning 9.4 percent of the total vote, or a rise of about 30 percent over its results in the June 2012 national elections. It finished as the third party in Greece and entered for the first time the European Parliament with three deputies. The party leader, Nikos Michaloliakos, declared from his prison cell, while still awaiting trial for running it as a criminal organisation: “We are already the arbiters of political developments; we are the forthcoming Greece.”

Who voted for this party, and why? Contrary to what you may have expected, the typical Golden Dawn voter is not an illiterate unemployed skinhead. As recent research shows, he (men are over-represented in the party) has the characteristics of the median Greek voter in terms of social status (middle class), education (university), and residence (urban). Still, having lost about 40 percent of his purchasing power since the start of the crisis and living in the country with the highest unemployment rate in Europe, he is uneasy with capitalism and market competition, mistrustful of mutually reinforcing institutions, and uncomfortable with the idea of political consensus. And, like most other Greeks these days, he is angry. But not because the crisis has robbed them of a future; it is because they lost, almost instantaneously, what the old parties had given them foolishly, and in most cases unreservedly, in the past.

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From Greek Crisis, to Turnaround

by George A. Provopoulos

Wall Street Journal
May 19, 2014

Several years ago a chorus of voices predicted that Greece would have to exit the euro zone. The doomsayers had it that Greece would not be able to make the fiscal and economic reforms needed to keep the country in the euro, nor would it be able to save its banking system in the face of an unprecedented sovereign-debt crisis. According to the doomsayers, attempts to bring down the budget deficit and restore competitiveness would lead to painful and politically unacceptable consequences, while a collapse of the banking system was inevitable. Recently, however, the sirens of doom have been silenced. How did that happen?

Since the onset of the crisis almost five years ago, the turn-around of the Greek economy has been remarkable. Last year the government booked a primary fiscal surplus of nearly 1% of GDP, after the primary balance swung from a deficit of 10.5% of GDP in 2009.

Since then, competitiveness—as measured by labor costs relative to those of Greece's trading partners—has improved by more than 30%. Competitiveness is also being promoted through structural reforms, which have increased the flexibility of labor and product markets.

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European Elections to Test Greek Coalition

by Simon Nixon

Wall Street Journal
May 18, 2014

There seems to be a broad consensus—among voters and in the markets—that this week's European parliamentary elections don't matter very much.

Although the Parliament has gained new powers over the years, few voters identify with it. Polls suggest many will see the election as an opportunity to cast protest votes for populist parties. Most voters suspect the outcome will make little difference to the future direction of Europe, which will in any case continue to be set by national leaders and parliaments.

But there is one country where the European elections really do matter.

In Greece, the elections will determine the future of the uneasy coalition government led by Prime Minister Antonis Samaras since June 2012. If the two coalition parties—New Democracy and Pasok—get a lower combined vote than the radical left-wing opposition party Syriza, the government would be in real trouble, acknowledges a senior minister. The outcome could be early national elections and a prolonged period of political instability.

As things stand, that seems unlikely: The latest polls suggest New Democracy will get 21% of the vote and Pasok 5.5%, compared with 21.5% for Syriza.

But even this may not be enough to guarantee the coalition's survival.

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‘If the euro falls, Europe falls’

by Peter Spiegel

Financial Times
May 15, 2014

As soon as Angela Merkel was handed the piece of paper Barack Obama had just passed around the table, her guard went up. “What is this?” the German chancellor asked. “I haven’t seen this before.”

The US president characterised the paper as talking points he and his seven European counterparts in the room could rally around when the Group of 20 summit ended that afternoon in Los Cabos, Mexico.

Most of the items were concise recitations of what had been formally agreed. But the last point was something new, say officials who read the sheet: a full-scale endorsement of a plan that had only been informally shopped around the summit by the man sitting next to Ms Merkel – Mario Monti, the Italian prime minister.

The scheme, which Mr Monti and his closest advisers had been working on for months before the June 2012 summit, called for the European Central Bank to protect eurozone countries when they came under attack from financial markets by automatically buying their bonds.

Only “virtuous” countries that obeyed the EU’s budget rules would be eligible. But the Monti plan would ensure borrowing costs, which for Italy and Spain were again rising to dangerous levels, would be capped.

“We wanted to develop something that would not be dangerous for the control of the money supply in Europe, would not be offensive to German purism, would help concretely moderate the [bond] spreads, but could be earned only as a reward for virtue,” Mr Monti told the Financial Times.

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Inside Europe’s Plan Z

by Pieter Spiegel

Financial Times
May 14, 2014

Every working day since the crisis struck, George Provo­poulos, the silver-haired governor of Greece’s central bank, summoned a small “emergency team” of aides to his offices at 6pm to review the health of the nation’s banks. What he was told on June 15 2012 was enough to make the courtly central banker blanch.

It was the Friday before a parliamentary election – the second national vote in as many months – and the country appeared to be edging towards panic. On that day, Greeks withdrew more than €3bn from their bank accounts, or about 1.5 per cent of the country’s entire economic output. The Bank of Greece had watched people moving money from their banks to their mattresses for nearly three years, but never on such a scale.

“In a matter of a few days, a full-blown banking crisis could have erupted,” Mr Provopoulos said in an interview. At that rate, Greece would run out of bank notes in a day or two.

Unbeknown to almost the entire Greek political establishment, however, a small group of EU and International Monetary Fund officials had been working clandestinely for months preparing for a collapse of Greece’s banks. Their secret blueprint, known as “Plan Z”, was a detailed script of how to reconstruct Greece’s economic and financial infrastructure if it were to leave the euro.

The plan was drawn up by about two dozen officials in small teams at the European Commission in Brussels, the European Central Bank in Frankfurt and the IMF in Washington. Officials who worked on the previously undisclosed plan insisted it was not a road map to force Greece out of the euro – quite the opposite. “Grexit”, they feared, would wreak havoc in European financial markets, causing bank runs in other teetering eurozone economies and raising questions of which country would be forced out next.

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How the euro was saved

by Pieter Spiegel

Financial Times
May 11, 2014

To the astonishment of almost everyone in the room, Angela Merkel began to cry.

“Das ist nicht fair.” That is not fair, the German chancellor said angrily, tears welling in her eyes. “Ich bringe mich nicht selbst um.” I am not going to commit suicide.

For those who witnessed the breakdown in a small conference room in the French seaside resort of Cannes, it was shocking enough to watch Europe’s most powerful and emotionally controlled leader brought to tears.

But the scene was even more remarkable, those present said, for the two objects of her ire: the man sitting next to her, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and the other across the table, US President Barack Obama.

It would be the low point in a brutal, recrimination-filled night, one many participants would recall as the nadir of the three-year eurozone crisis. Mr Sarkozy had hoped his leadership of the Group of 20 summit would cement his standing on the global stage en route to re-election. Instead, everything was falling apart.

Greece was imploding politically; Italy, a country too big to bail out, appeared just days away from being cut off from global financial markets; and Ms Merkel, try as Mr Sarkozy and Mr Obama might, could not be convinced to increase German contributions to the eurozone’s “firewall” – the “big bazooka” or “wall of money” they believed had to grow dramatically to fend off attacks by panicking bond traders.

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